Lecture 1: Computation in the Physical World

Speaker: Professor John Symons

Chair: Professor XING Taotao

Time: 08 OCT, 2019, 15:10-18:00

Place: Classroom 406, Second Teaching Building, PKU

Abstract: In the 1980s Hilary Putnam argued against computational functionalism. As part of his argument he claimed to have provided a proof that any physical object can implement any finite state automaton. This strange assertion implies, for example, that a rock can be said to compute any piece of software. Philosophers have responded with a variety of objections to Putnam’s argument and have proposed alternative accounts of computation that avoid what has come to be called the triviality objection to computationalism. In this talk, I examine the accounts of physical computation that have been offered to date and propose an alternative definition of physical computation. On my account a physical computer is a system that reliably solves a computational problem. I explain what a computational problem is and what it means for a system to solve it reliably.

Lecture 2: Computing with Bodies

Speaker: Professor John Symons

Chair: Professor CHEN Bo

Time: 09 OCT, 2019, 14:30-17:00

Place: B112, Department of Philosophy, Peking University

Abstract: Morphological computation is a branch of robotics that uses the bodily structure of robots to solve computational problems that would otherwise require massive computational processing power. In this talk, I explain the theory of morphological computation and the challenges that it poses to traditional philosophy of computation. I show how adopting the perspective on physical computation that I defended in the first lecture solves these problems. I explain how bodies evolve to solve computational problems with specific examples from the neuroscience of the visual system.

Lecture 3: The Role of the Theory of Computation in Philosophy of Mind

Speaker: Professor John Symons

Chair: Dr LI Qilin

Time: 10 OCT, 2019, 14:30-17:00

Place: 3109, Department of Philosophy, PKU

Abstract: Why did the computational model of mind take center stage in the 1960s and 1970s? How did it help and how did it hurt our understanding of mind? This lecture explains the strange role of the theory of computation in the philosophy of mind. I examine various forms of anti-computationalism in philosophy of mind focusing on the role of computational theory in these debates. In addition, successful reductionist criticisms of multiple realization from sub-cellular neuroscience pose significant challenges to the nonreductive physicalist consensus in philosophy of mind. I argue that if we understand computation in the terms I defend, we can see how to integrate evolutionary and biological considerations smoothly with the theory of mind.

Lecture 4: Computing with Natural Information

Speaker: Professor John Symons

Chair: Professor CHEN Bo

Time: 11 OCT, 2019, 14:30-17:00

Place: 3109, Department of Philosophy, PKU

Abstract: This lecture defends an account of natural information that answers central questions about the emergence of normativity in nature. Specifically, I explain the teleosemantic account of natural information processing that is due primarily to the work of Ruth Millikan. I defend Millikan’s view against objections and show how it connects with theories of signaling from Brian Skyrms and others. The teleosemantic approach to content can be grounded in the account of computing that I defend in these lectures. I argue that teleosemantics provides the best available account of the possibility of misrepresentation and more generally for the emergence of the normative aspects of representation.

Lecture 5: The Emergence of Minimal Cognition: Modality and Mind

Speaker: Professor John Symons

Chair: Professor CHEN Bo

Time: 15 OCT, 2019, 14:30-17:00

Place: B112, Department of Philosophy, Peking University

Abstract: Drawing from examples in plant cognition, I explain the emergence of natural information processing systems. I explain the extent to which these systems deserve to be called minds. Minds of human persons have distinctive normative capacities associated with their access to facts about possible states of affairs. There is a vast gulf between plant minds and human minds. In this talk I will explain the novel capacities that emerge with the solution of new problems over the course of natural history.