时间：15:10-18:00
地点：文史楼215
讲座标题：Frege’s use of function-argument analysis and his introduction of truth-values as objects

摘要：
One of Frege’s most characteristic ideas is his conception of truth-values as
objects. On his account (from 1891 onwards), concepts are functions that map
objects onto one of the two truth-values, the True and the False. Th ese two
truth-values are also seen as objects, an implication of Frege’s sharp distinction
between objects and functions. Crucial to this account is his use of functionargument
analysis, and in this paper I explore the relationship between this use
and his introduction of truth-values as objects.
In the fi rst section I look at Frege’s use of function-argument analysis in his
fi rst work, the Begriff sschrift, and stress the importance of the idea that such a
use permits alternative analyses. In the second section I examine his early notion
of conceptual content, and argue that there is a problem in understanding that
notion once alternative analyses are allowed. In the third section I turn to his key
1891 paper, ‘Function and Concept’, where the idea of truth-values as objects
fi rst appears, and consider its motivation. In the concluding section I comment
on Frege’s general philosophical approach, which allowed objects to be readily
‘analyzed out’ in transforming one sentence into another.

主讲人简介：Mike Beaney, 英国约克大学哲学系教授，国际知名的弗雷格学者，《英国哲学史杂志》主编。