5月30日（周四）美国亚利桑那大学Shaun Nichols教授讲座“Lexical Semantics and the Self”
来源：会议讲座
作者：
时间：2019-05-26
北京大学哲学系、北京大学外国哲学研究所、北京大学分析哲学研究中心联合举办的“分析哲学学术名家讲座系列活动”即将在本周四（05月30日）15:00于北京大学李兆基人文学苑3号院109室举行，此次活动将邀请美国亚利桑那大学Shaun Nichols教授主讲“Lexical Semantics and the Self”。相关信息如下：
讲座时间：2019年05月30日（周四）15:00-17:00
讲座主题：Lexical Semantics and the Self
主讲人：Professor Shaun Nichols (the University of Arizona)
讲座地点：北京大学李兆基人文学苑3号院109室
讲座内容摘要：
Prevailing philosophical accounts of persons provide a reduction of the notion of person or self. For instance, on one prominent account, the person is the mind. On another prominent view, the person is the body or the brain. A third, supernatural view, is that the person is the soul. These are all reductive accounts that attempt to explain the person/self in terms of something else. We show that the terms mind, body and soul are all instances of inalienably possessed nouns, in English and in five other unrelated languages. The denotation of these nouns is intrinsically relational, and presupposes a “possessor”. Thus, we argue that lexical analysis shows that mind, body and soul encode a presupposition of being a subpart of, the self. We conclude that considerations from lexical semantics show that the terms for these traditional categories – mind, body, and soul – are semantically excluded from being the same thing as the self.
（讲座大纲与相关阅读材料将在报告现场分发）
讲座时间：2019年05月30日（周四）15:00-17:00
讲座主题：Lexical Semantics and the Self
主讲人：Professor Shaun Nichols (the University of Arizona)
讲座地点：北京大学李兆基人文学苑3号院109室
讲座内容摘要：
Prevailing philosophical accounts of persons provide a reduction of the notion of person or self. For instance, on one prominent account, the person is the mind. On another prominent view, the person is the body or the brain. A third, supernatural view, is that the person is the soul. These are all reductive accounts that attempt to explain the person/self in terms of something else. We show that the terms mind, body and soul are all instances of inalienably possessed nouns, in English and in five other unrelated languages. The denotation of these nouns is intrinsically relational, and presupposes a “possessor”. Thus, we argue that lexical analysis shows that mind, body and soul encode a presupposition of being a subpart of, the self. We conclude that considerations from lexical semantics show that the terms for these traditional categories – mind, body, and soul – are semantically excluded from being the same thing as the self.
（讲座大纲与相关阅读材料将在报告现场分发）