时间：10月13日12:10-12:50

地点：哲学系 B114

主讲人：丁一峰

题目: "The Modesty Puzzle"

摘要：

It seems extremely natural to suspect that something we believe is in fact false. After all, there is no shortage of memories of admitting mistakes. However, according to a classic theory of belief, it is necessary for us to believe that everything we believe is true. In the past, I have used this observation to motivate an alternative formal semantics for belief and a weaker logic of belief with propositional quantifiers, but as a recent paper by Jeremy Goodman points out, the logic may not be weak enough, because even in the alternative semantics, being modest: believing (not just suspecting) that something we believe is false, comes with the price of inconsistency. In this talk, I will mainly try to present carefully why it is so difficult to be modest in these theories of belief, and then offer some very preliminary thoughts on the apparent difficulty.

本次报告将用英文进行。以下是中文版标题和摘要。

标题：谦虚难题
摘要：怀疑我们的某些信念其实是错的是一件特别自然的事情。毕竟我们从不缺少承认错误的记忆。然而，根据一种经典的信念理论，必然地，我们相信我们所相信的所有都是真的。此前，我基于这个观察提出了另一种信念的形式语义以及一个更弱的包含命题量词的信念逻辑，然而Jeremy Goodman的一篇新近文章指出这个更弱的逻辑可能还不够弱，因为即便在这另一种形式语义下，保持谦虚，也即相信（而不只是怀疑）有某个我们相信的事情其实是错的，的代价是不一致。在这次报告里，我将主要小心地展示为何在这些信念理论中保持谦虚是如此困难，然后我将提供一些关于这种困难的初步想法。

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