活动通知

时间：5月12日12：10-13:00

地点：哲学系 B114

主讲人：刘媛媛

题目: Are Intentions Even Required for Omissions to be Intentional?

摘要: The topic of omissions, especially intentional omissions has drawn more and more attention from philosophers, but this term has been used by them in a pretty dispersive way, e.g., Ginet and Clarke disputing on how to spell the kind of intentions required for omissions to be intentional. It is not a new struggle for philosophers, the cases of intentional actions share the same issue. Namely, the relationship between intentions and actions that we call intentional has never reached a consensus and remains debatable. For instance, it is rarely self-explanatory that when we state intentional actions, whether we imply the actions that are done precisely out of intentions, or those that are done knowingly. Things got trickier in cases of omissions, due to its mysterious nature of never occurring. In some of the cases that people commonly deem as intentional omissions, an intention to not act might never be generated by the agent, which leads us to the following question: Are intentions even required for omissions to be intentional? In a short answer, I propose to defend for a strict view of the intention condition, which applies to both cases of intentional actions and omissions.

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