讲座嘉宾简介：

Sanford Goldberg博士毕业于哥伦比亚大学，现为西北大学教授。他的研究领域涉及知识论、语言哲学和心灵哲学，特别集中在关于证言和证成的知识论、社会知识论、自我知识和怀疑论、可靠主义、命题态度、言语行为和意义理论等方面。他的专著包括Anti-Individualism (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Relying on Others (Oxford University Press, 2010), Assertion (Oxford University Press, 2015), and To the Best of Our Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2018)。

作为知识论领域的专家，哲学系特别邀请其分别在2019年10月15日和17日举行两场讲座，报告其最新的研究成果，这两场讲座的主题分别为：

讲座1：“I’m Telling You”

ABSTRACT： 

Recent work in speech act theory and in the epistemology of testimony has focused on the ways that an audience can wrong a speaker who tells her something.  (This is a theme in work by Elizabeth Anscombe, Miranda Fricker, Alan Gibbard, Ted Hinchman, and Richard Moran.). In this paper I explore the speaker’s expectation of proper treatment by the audience: what the speaker is entitled to expect, and why, and how this squares with a proper account of the epistemology of testimony.

时间：10月15日19：00 - 21：00
地点：二教423

讲座2：“The Epistemic Significance of Unpossessed Evidence”

ABSTRACT：

Traditional epistemic assessment of an individual only takes into account the evidence in the subject’s possession. In this paper I argue that this is mistake: when it comes to the epistemic assessment of an individual’s beliefs, we would do well to acknowledge that some evidence can be epistemically significant even when the subject herself fails to possess that evidence.  The aim is to establish this in terms of an approach to epistemology that takes seriously the extent to which we depend on one another for information about our world.

时间：10月17日19：00 - 21：00
地点：二教420