美国现象学技术哲学家伊德在北大举办系列讲座（4月6日－12日）
来源：会议讲座
作者：
时间：2006-04-03
美国纽约州立大学石溪（Stony Brook）分校哲学教授Don Ihde系列讲座
4月6日（星期四）上午9：00
“What is Postphenomenology?” 什么是后现象学？
地点：北京大学哲学系四院一楼会议室
4月7日（星期五）下午14：00
“Technoscience and Postphenomenology” 技术科学和后现象学
地点：北京大学承泽园科社中心学术报告厅
4月8日（星期六）下午14：00
“Visualizing the Invisible: Imaging Technologies”
不可见者的可见化：成像技术
地点：北京大学承泽园科社中心学术报告厅
4月9日（星期日）上午9：00
“Do Things ‘Speak’?: A Material Hermeneutics”
事物“说话”？：一种物质的解释学
地点：北京大学哲学系四院一楼会议室
4月12日（星期三）下午14：00
“The Hermeneutic Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur”
保罗?利科的解释学哲学
地点：北京大学外哲基地 老化学楼227
系列讲座内容简介
李忠伟 蔡文菁 译
四个系列讲座：当代生活世界里的后现象学
经典现象学于二十世纪初在胡塞尔的著作里成型，然后其他人以不同的方式对其进行了修改，其中马丁?海德格尔、梅罗－庞蒂、萨特和利科是著名的重要人物。这个系列讲座将重新评价现象学，并着重强调从二十世纪末延续到二十一世纪的当代世界出现的哲学问题，这个讲座将置于科学和技术在当代生活世界里的逐渐变换着的角色。
什么是后现象学？
在这个开场讲座里，我将把“经典”现象学和被我称作“技术科学”的东西置于历史语境中，并从一个当代视角出发，来考察在这一语境中引起现象学策略向后现象学修正的转变。我的观点是，与二十世纪的旧语境相比，如今所说的现象学、科学以及技术已经在二十一世纪初发生了巨大的转变。
经典现象学（首先是胡塞尔的现象学），是在一个“现代”哲学起支配作用的特定历史语境下形成的。这个时代的哲学是“现代的”，它伴随着对于“主体/客体”，“身体/心灵”，“外在/内在”世界之间的区分，在胡塞尔看来，笛卡儿和康德在很大程度上为这种哲学树立了典范。对于科学而言，二十世纪早期的科学哲学家倾向于将其刻画为由理论引导的极抽象的以及数学化的实践。在技术方面，无论是哲学还是科学均对物质技术方面的作用毫不敏感。我将力图证明，胡塞尔的现象学是试图对这些观念进行彻底挑战的“严格的科学”。例如，他的《笛卡儿式的沉思》挑战并且倒转了笛卡儿，他的《危机》挑战了早期的科学现代观。尽管如此，现代的阴影仍然笼罩着经典现象学，并使其被讽刺性地认为是“主体主义的”哲学。
我将回顾在拜托早期现代哲学过程中发生的一些重要转变，以及在科学哲学里和那些提高对物质技术敏感性的那些变化。然后，我将在一个当代背景下返回到现象学，并提出一种后现象学。简言之，这种经过修改的现象学将会（a）替代实用主义的某些流派（STRANDS），它将在其解释框架里保留一个很强的体验的观念，但是又不会陷入到早期现代哲学的阴影中；（b）它将保留和提升现象学上变更知觉和体现的重要作用，也会保留和提升对于现象学来说非常重要的实践的作用；（c）最后，它将把作为当代技术哲学之特征的“经验转向”与其在科学和技术研究中的具体性相结合。
技术科学和后现象学
第二个演讲将首先对二十世纪中后期人们对物质技术和技术哲学之发展日益增大的兴趣进行一番考察。哲学对于技术的兴趣似乎迟到了一些。尽管早在十九世纪，欧洲、美洲以及之后亚洲部分地区的技术变革已经通过工业技术激发了哲学家的思想，如马克思和Kapp，但是直到工业化技术的效用在第一次世界大战中实现了军事化时，一些主要的哲学家才开始严肃地关注起这一问题。在欧洲，技术成为了奥尔特加?加塞特(Ortega y Gassett)、尼古拉斯?别尔佳耶夫(Nicolas Berdyaev)、亚斯贝尔斯、尤其是海德格尔的探讨主题。在美国，李维斯?芒福德（Lewis Mumford）以及杜威也成为了技术哲学的先锋。
虽然在这些早期的技术哲学家那里存在着显著的区别――例如，大多数欧洲哲学家只对普遍意义上的技术感兴趣，他们大多对技术采取批判的以及反乌托邦的态度，但是美国哲学家却更具乐观主义的倾向，并且在某种程度上更具经验导向――人们可能会注意到正是以下这些实践哲学（praxis philosophies）：马克思主义，实用主义和现象学――对技术产生了实质性的兴趣。
在世纪中叶，其它以实践为中心的社会科学运动，也对技术和物质性产生了更浓厚的兴趣。新的科学社会学挑战了传统的仅偏重于理论的科学哲学，并转向实验室实践和仪器使用。“社会建构”、“强纲领”（strong program）和“实验室生活”开始塑造起一个新的科学形象，它更为社会多元且更多地在物质上被生产。此后，女权主义哲学家也在关注于性别和形体化的过程中转向了技术科学。我将简要概观这些使科学和技术的形象转变为技术科学的运动的主要特征。
随后，在这个演?的其余部分，我将集中探讨的是：在第二代技术哲学家中形成的现象学如何将物质性、工具、实践整合入一个更具后现象学风格的分析中，以及在近期出版物和会议上得到认同的“经验转向”。
不可见者的可见化：成像技术
第三个演讲将提供一个对成像技术的后现象学分析的个案研究。我将试图阐明，在严格和强化的意义上，科学总是已经技术地或工具性地体现了，但是随着工具的改变，科学的世界以及我们对科学知识的理解也发生了变化。从一个有关历史的主题入手，我将展示在许多前历史的文化里产生的前现代科学是如何把简单的工具和知觉的观察结合的；随后，伴随着在早期现代性中的新光学技术，便产生了“现代”科学；而从20世纪起进入了高科技的成像工具时代，如今一种后现代的科学也产生了。
这个最新的科学同时将知识生产带入了超出人类体现的领域，但同时在这个过程中又显示出人们怎样必然地要将体现因素考虑进来。在必须依靠听觉－视觉而表现的成像技术的新过程中，这一反讽也得到了清楚的展现。这个演讲将会把最近科学实践的关注焦点置于可视化之上，并且说明不可见者是如何被可视化的。
事物“说话”？：一种物质的解释学
第四个演讲将在一系列从相似物到感观之诸多维度的转变中，把当代成像技术的例子延展至“给予事物以声音”的技术。在此我的论点是，通过将新工具应用于人文和社会科学的问题之上，人文和社会科学将能够获益于结合了新近自然科学实践的新的成像革命。借助视听的说明，我将提供有限数量的个案研究，来表明一种物质性的解释学如何可能且确实有用。
其中的一个例子将会是“阿尔卑斯冰人”(Otzi the Iceman), 或者是关于1911年在意大利阿尔卑斯山发现的冻干木乃伊的构成的知识叙述，另外一个例子是由工具产生数据的实验性发展，这些研究所考察的并非当前科学所实践的寻常的可视化，而是进入了对社会和自然科学均有意义的听觉呈现。
保罗?利科的解释学哲学
欧洲的二十世纪产生了三位主要的解释学哲学家：马丁?海德格尔、汉斯－格奥格?伽达默尔和保罗?利科。随着去年保罗?利科的去世，这一主要的哲学运动就成为了纪念碑似的哲学历史。这个讲座将会从侧面关注海德格尔和伽达默尔，但是集中关注保罗?利科的独特的解释学途径。这种批判性解释风格的特征包含着与现象学的连续和持久的关系，但是这种解释却独特的利科式风格。利科认为，现象学必须和解释学结合，否则就会是主观主义的和唯心主义的。第二，利科的解释学途径一直是辨证的，以致某些并非他自己的（方法）途径也需要被考虑进来。因此，结构主义、心理分析、分析哲学和一系列的其它途径在利科的解释学中也发出重要的声音。第三，利科自己的途径总是自我－限制的，这是因为这个途径有一个本质的辨证结构。这个讲座将会探求并找描绘出种独特的解释学的这些特征。
美国Stony Brook大学哲学教授Don Ihde 2006年春季北京大学系列讲座提纲
A lecture series by Don Ihde, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
Stony Brook University, New York
Four Lecture Series: Postphenomenology in the Contemporary Lifeworld
Classical phenomenology was forged at the beginning of the 20th century, firs
t from the work of Edumund Husserl, but modified in different ways by others,
including Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Ri
coeur as noted principals.along with many others as well. This lecture series
will re-evaluate phenomenology with particular emphasis upon the philosophic
al problems which have emerged at the end of the 20th century, on into the co
ntemporary world of the 21st century. Particular emphasis will be placed on
the changing roles which science and technology have played in the contempora
ry lifeworld.
“What is Postphenomenology?”
In this opening lecture, I shall place both ‘classical’ phenomenology and
what I shall call ‘technoscience’ in a historical context, and then from a
contemporary perspective, examine the changes in that context which motivate
revisions in phenomenological strategies towards a ‘postphenomenology.’ I
t is my contention that there have been significant changes to what can count
today as phenomenology, science and technology ,at the beginning of the 21st
, compared to the older context of the early 20th century.
Classical phenomenology, first under Edmund Husserl, was formulated within a
specific historical context in which ‘modern’ philosophies dominated. The
philosophy of this period was ‘modern’ with its distinctions between “sub
ject/object,” “body/mind,” “external/internal” worlds, and for Husserl w
ere largely exemplified by Descartes and Kant. For science, the early 20th c
entury philosophers of science tended to characterize science as a largely ab
stract, mathematized, practice which was primarily theory-driven. And, regard
ing technology, neither philosophy nor science could be said to be sensitive
to the roles of material technologies. I will contend that while Husserl’s
phenomenology as a new “rigorous science” attempted to radically challenge
these notions. For example, his Cartesian Meditations challenged and inverte
d Descartes, and his Crisis challenged the early modern notion of science. Y
et, in spite of this the shadows of the modern remained attached to classical
phenomenology which ironically became known as a ‘subjectivist’ philosophy
I shall then review some of the major changes in the escapes from early mode
rn philosophy, others in the philosophy of science, and others which enhanced
the sensitivity to material technologies. Then, returning to phenomenology
in a contemporary setting, I shall make a case for a postphenomenology. Put
briefly, such a modified phenomenology would (a) substitute strands of pragma
tism, which retains a strong notion of experience in its interpretive framewo
rk, but does so without falling under the shadow of early modern philosophy;
(b) retain and enhance the central roles of phenomenological variations, per
ception and embodiment, and the role of practice as central to phenomenology;
(c) and , finally, incorporate the now so-called “empirical turn” which ch
aracterizes contemporary philosophy of technology with its concreteness of sc
ience and technology studies.
“Technoscience and Postphenomenology”
The second lecture will open with a view towards the mid-to late 20th centur
y rise of interest in material technologies and the development of philosophi
es of technology. Philosophy seems to have come late to interests in technol
ogies. Although the technological transformations of Europe, America, and la
ter parts of Asia, by industrial technologies did stimulate some philosophers
as early as the 19th century, namely Karl Marx and Ernst Kapp, it was not un
til the effects of industrialized technologies became militarized during Worl
d War I, that major philosophers became seriously engaged. In Europe, techno
logy became a theme with Ortega y Gassett, Nicolas Berdyaev, Karl Jaspers, bu
t most of all, Martin Heidegger. In America Lewis Mumford and John Dewey als
o pioneered in what was to become philosophy of technology.
While there were marked differences between these early philosophers of tech
nology—for example, most of the Europeans were interested in technology-in-g
eneral, were mostly critical or took a dystopian attitude, whereas the Americ
ans tended more towards optimism and in some degree were more empirically ori
ented—one could note that it was the praxis philosophies: Marxism, pragmatis
m, phenomenology—that developed the interest in the material.
By mid-century other social science movements, also practice centered, accel
erated the interest in technologies and materiality. New sociologies of scie
nce challenged traditional theory-biased philosophies of science, and turned
to laboratory practices and the role of instrumentation. “Social constructi
on,” the “Strong Program,” “Laboratory Life,” began to formulate a new i
mage of science which was both more socially multidimensioned and materially
produced. Later still, feminist philosophers also turned to technoscience wi
th emphases upon gender and embodiment. I shall briefly look at some of the
major features of these movements which helped shift the image of science and
technology towards technoscience.
Then, in the remainder of this lecture, I shall concentrate upon the way phe
nomenology amongst a second generation of philosophers of technology, began t
o incorporate materiality, instruments, praxis into a more postphenomenologic
al style of analysis and its “empirical turn” as recognized in recent publi
cations and conferences.
“Visualizing the Invisible: Imaging Technologies”
The third lecture will develop a case study in a postphenomenological analys
is of imaging technologies. I shall contend that science, in a rigorous and
robust sense, has always been technologically or instrumentally embodied, bu
t that as its instruments change, so does its world and our understanding of
scientific knowledge. Beginning with a historical thesis showing how pre-mod
ern science occurred in many cultures in pre-history which incorporated perc
eptual observations with simple instruments; then with new optical technologi
es in early modernity produced ‘modern’ science; and then, only since the 2
0th century moved into the high-technology imaging instruments, now produces
a postmodern science.
This newest science simultaneously takes knowledge production into the realm
of that which lies beyond human embodiment—but, in the process shows how on
e must necessarily take embodiment into account. This irony is shown explici
tly in the new processes of imaging technologies, all of which will be audio-
visually illustrated. This lecture will emphasize the focus of most current
science practice upon visualization and illustrate how the invisible is visua
lized.
“Do Things ‘Speak’?: A Material Hermeneutics”
The fourth lecture will extend the example of contemporary imaging technolo
gies to technologies which “give things voices,” in a series of variations
from analogs to many dimensions of the sensorium. The contention here is tha
t the humanities and the social sciences could benefit from the new imaging r
evolution by incorporating the recent practices of the natural sciences by ap
plying new instrumentation to humanities and social science questions. Agai
n, illustrated audio-visually, I will develop a limited number of case studie
s to show how such a material hermeneutics can and does work.
One of these examples will be “Otzi, the Iceman,” or the narrative of cons
tituted knowledge current about the 1991 freeze-dried mummy found in the Ital
ian Alps, and another will be the experimental development of instrument prod
uced data, not into the usual visualization practiced by current science, but
into acoustic presentations which have implications for both the social and
natural sciences.
“The Hermeneutic Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur”
The 20th century in Europe produced three major hermeneutic philosophers: Ma
rtin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. With the death of Paul
Ricoeur just last year, this major movement becomes philosophical history, mo
numental as it is. This lecture, while taking side glimpses at Heidegger an
d Gadamer, will focus upon the unique hermeneutical approach of Paul Ricoeur.
The features of this style of critical interpretation include a continuous
and constant relationship to phenomenology, albeit of a distinctly Ricoeurea
n type. Ricoeur argued that phenomenology must be tied to hermeneutics in o
rder not to be subjectivistic or idealistic. Secondly, Ricoeur’s hermeneuti
c approach was always dialectical in that some approach to methods other than
his own, always needed to be taken into account. Thus structuralism, psycho
analysis, analytic philosophy and a series of other approaches played a major
second voice in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Thirdly, Ricoeur’s own approach w
as always self-limiting, precisely because of its essentially dialectical str
ucture. The lecture will explore and trace out these features of a unique he
rmeneutics.
4月6日（星期四）上午9：00
“What is Postphenomenology?” 什么是后现象学？
地点：北京大学哲学系四院一楼会议室
4月7日（星期五）下午14：00
“Technoscience and Postphenomenology” 技术科学和后现象学
地点：北京大学承泽园科社中心学术报告厅
4月8日（星期六）下午14：00
“Visualizing the Invisible: Imaging Technologies”
不可见者的可见化：成像技术
地点：北京大学承泽园科社中心学术报告厅
4月9日（星期日）上午9：00
“Do Things ‘Speak’?: A Material Hermeneutics”
事物“说话”？：一种物质的解释学
地点：北京大学哲学系四院一楼会议室
4月12日（星期三）下午14：00
“The Hermeneutic Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur”
保罗?利科的解释学哲学
地点：北京大学外哲基地 老化学楼227
系列讲座内容简介
李忠伟 蔡文菁 译
四个系列讲座：当代生活世界里的后现象学
经典现象学于二十世纪初在胡塞尔的著作里成型，然后其他人以不同的方式对其进行了修改，其中马丁?海德格尔、梅罗－庞蒂、萨特和利科是著名的重要人物。这个系列讲座将重新评价现象学，并着重强调从二十世纪末延续到二十一世纪的当代世界出现的哲学问题，这个讲座将置于科学和技术在当代生活世界里的逐渐变换着的角色。
什么是后现象学？
在这个开场讲座里，我将把“经典”现象学和被我称作“技术科学”的东西置于历史语境中，并从一个当代视角出发，来考察在这一语境中引起现象学策略向后现象学修正的转变。我的观点是，与二十世纪的旧语境相比，如今所说的现象学、科学以及技术已经在二十一世纪初发生了巨大的转变。
经典现象学（首先是胡塞尔的现象学），是在一个“现代”哲学起支配作用的特定历史语境下形成的。这个时代的哲学是“现代的”，它伴随着对于“主体/客体”，“身体/心灵”，“外在/内在”世界之间的区分，在胡塞尔看来，笛卡儿和康德在很大程度上为这种哲学树立了典范。对于科学而言，二十世纪早期的科学哲学家倾向于将其刻画为由理论引导的极抽象的以及数学化的实践。在技术方面，无论是哲学还是科学均对物质技术方面的作用毫不敏感。我将力图证明，胡塞尔的现象学是试图对这些观念进行彻底挑战的“严格的科学”。例如，他的《笛卡儿式的沉思》挑战并且倒转了笛卡儿，他的《危机》挑战了早期的科学现代观。尽管如此，现代的阴影仍然笼罩着经典现象学，并使其被讽刺性地认为是“主体主义的”哲学。
我将回顾在拜托早期现代哲学过程中发生的一些重要转变，以及在科学哲学里和那些提高对物质技术敏感性的那些变化。然后，我将在一个当代背景下返回到现象学，并提出一种后现象学。简言之，这种经过修改的现象学将会（a）替代实用主义的某些流派（STRANDS），它将在其解释框架里保留一个很强的体验的观念，但是又不会陷入到早期现代哲学的阴影中；（b）它将保留和提升现象学上变更知觉和体现的重要作用，也会保留和提升对于现象学来说非常重要的实践的作用；（c）最后，它将把作为当代技术哲学之特征的“经验转向”与其在科学和技术研究中的具体性相结合。
技术科学和后现象学
第二个演讲将首先对二十世纪中后期人们对物质技术和技术哲学之发展日益增大的兴趣进行一番考察。哲学对于技术的兴趣似乎迟到了一些。尽管早在十九世纪，欧洲、美洲以及之后亚洲部分地区的技术变革已经通过工业技术激发了哲学家的思想，如马克思和Kapp，但是直到工业化技术的效用在第一次世界大战中实现了军事化时，一些主要的哲学家才开始严肃地关注起这一问题。在欧洲，技术成为了奥尔特加?加塞特(Ortega y Gassett)、尼古拉斯?别尔佳耶夫(Nicolas Berdyaev)、亚斯贝尔斯、尤其是海德格尔的探讨主题。在美国，李维斯?芒福德（Lewis Mumford）以及杜威也成为了技术哲学的先锋。
虽然在这些早期的技术哲学家那里存在着显著的区别――例如，大多数欧洲哲学家只对普遍意义上的技术感兴趣，他们大多对技术采取批判的以及反乌托邦的态度，但是美国哲学家却更具乐观主义的倾向，并且在某种程度上更具经验导向――人们可能会注意到正是以下这些实践哲学（praxis philosophies）：马克思主义，实用主义和现象学――对技术产生了实质性的兴趣。
在世纪中叶，其它以实践为中心的社会科学运动，也对技术和物质性产生了更浓厚的兴趣。新的科学社会学挑战了传统的仅偏重于理论的科学哲学，并转向实验室实践和仪器使用。“社会建构”、“强纲领”（strong program）和“实验室生活”开始塑造起一个新的科学形象，它更为社会多元且更多地在物质上被生产。此后，女权主义哲学家也在关注于性别和形体化的过程中转向了技术科学。我将简要概观这些使科学和技术的形象转变为技术科学的运动的主要特征。
随后，在这个演?的其余部分，我将集中探讨的是：在第二代技术哲学家中形成的现象学如何将物质性、工具、实践整合入一个更具后现象学风格的分析中，以及在近期出版物和会议上得到认同的“经验转向”。
不可见者的可见化：成像技术
第三个演讲将提供一个对成像技术的后现象学分析的个案研究。我将试图阐明，在严格和强化的意义上，科学总是已经技术地或工具性地体现了，但是随着工具的改变，科学的世界以及我们对科学知识的理解也发生了变化。从一个有关历史的主题入手，我将展示在许多前历史的文化里产生的前现代科学是如何把简单的工具和知觉的观察结合的；随后，伴随着在早期现代性中的新光学技术，便产生了“现代”科学；而从20世纪起进入了高科技的成像工具时代，如今一种后现代的科学也产生了。
这个最新的科学同时将知识生产带入了超出人类体现的领域，但同时在这个过程中又显示出人们怎样必然地要将体现因素考虑进来。在必须依靠听觉－视觉而表现的成像技术的新过程中，这一反讽也得到了清楚的展现。这个演讲将会把最近科学实践的关注焦点置于可视化之上，并且说明不可见者是如何被可视化的。
事物“说话”？：一种物质的解释学
第四个演讲将在一系列从相似物到感观之诸多维度的转变中，把当代成像技术的例子延展至“给予事物以声音”的技术。在此我的论点是，通过将新工具应用于人文和社会科学的问题之上，人文和社会科学将能够获益于结合了新近自然科学实践的新的成像革命。借助视听的说明，我将提供有限数量的个案研究，来表明一种物质性的解释学如何可能且确实有用。
其中的一个例子将会是“阿尔卑斯冰人”(Otzi the Iceman), 或者是关于1911年在意大利阿尔卑斯山发现的冻干木乃伊的构成的知识叙述，另外一个例子是由工具产生数据的实验性发展，这些研究所考察的并非当前科学所实践的寻常的可视化，而是进入了对社会和自然科学均有意义的听觉呈现。
保罗?利科的解释学哲学
欧洲的二十世纪产生了三位主要的解释学哲学家：马丁?海德格尔、汉斯－格奥格?伽达默尔和保罗?利科。随着去年保罗?利科的去世，这一主要的哲学运动就成为了纪念碑似的哲学历史。这个讲座将会从侧面关注海德格尔和伽达默尔，但是集中关注保罗?利科的独特的解释学途径。这种批判性解释风格的特征包含着与现象学的连续和持久的关系，但是这种解释却独特的利科式风格。利科认为，现象学必须和解释学结合，否则就会是主观主义的和唯心主义的。第二，利科的解释学途径一直是辨证的，以致某些并非他自己的（方法）途径也需要被考虑进来。因此，结构主义、心理分析、分析哲学和一系列的其它途径在利科的解释学中也发出重要的声音。第三，利科自己的途径总是自我－限制的，这是因为这个途径有一个本质的辨证结构。这个讲座将会探求并找描绘出种独特的解释学的这些特征。
美国Stony Brook大学哲学教授Don Ihde 2006年春季北京大学系列讲座提纲
A lecture series by Don Ihde, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
Stony Brook University, New York
Four Lecture Series: Postphenomenology in the Contemporary Lifeworld
Classical phenomenology was forged at the beginning of the 20th century, firs
t from the work of Edumund Husserl, but modified in different ways by others,
including Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Ri
coeur as noted principals.along with many others as well. This lecture series
will re-evaluate phenomenology with particular emphasis upon the philosophic
al problems which have emerged at the end of the 20th century, on into the co
ntemporary world of the 21st century. Particular emphasis will be placed on
the changing roles which science and technology have played in the contempora
ry lifeworld.
“What is Postphenomenology?”
In this opening lecture, I shall place both ‘classical’ phenomenology and
what I shall call ‘technoscience’ in a historical context, and then from a
contemporary perspective, examine the changes in that context which motivate
revisions in phenomenological strategies towards a ‘postphenomenology.’ I
t is my contention that there have been significant changes to what can count
today as phenomenology, science and technology ,at the beginning of the 21st
, compared to the older context of the early 20th century.
Classical phenomenology, first under Edmund Husserl, was formulated within a
specific historical context in which ‘modern’ philosophies dominated. The
philosophy of this period was ‘modern’ with its distinctions between “sub
ject/object,” “body/mind,” “external/internal” worlds, and for Husserl w
ere largely exemplified by Descartes and Kant. For science, the early 20th c
entury philosophers of science tended to characterize science as a largely ab
stract, mathematized, practice which was primarily theory-driven. And, regard
ing technology, neither philosophy nor science could be said to be sensitive
to the roles of material technologies. I will contend that while Husserl’s
phenomenology as a new “rigorous science” attempted to radically challenge
these notions. For example, his Cartesian Meditations challenged and inverte
d Descartes, and his Crisis challenged the early modern notion of science. Y
et, in spite of this the shadows of the modern remained attached to classical
phenomenology which ironically became known as a ‘subjectivist’ philosophy
I shall then review some of the major changes in the escapes from early mode
rn philosophy, others in the philosophy of science, and others which enhanced
the sensitivity to material technologies. Then, returning to phenomenology
in a contemporary setting, I shall make a case for a postphenomenology. Put
briefly, such a modified phenomenology would (a) substitute strands of pragma
tism, which retains a strong notion of experience in its interpretive framewo
rk, but does so without falling under the shadow of early modern philosophy;
(b) retain and enhance the central roles of phenomenological variations, per
ception and embodiment, and the role of practice as central to phenomenology;
(c) and , finally, incorporate the now so-called “empirical turn” which ch
aracterizes contemporary philosophy of technology with its concreteness of sc
ience and technology studies.
“Technoscience and Postphenomenology”
The second lecture will open with a view towards the mid-to late 20th centur
y rise of interest in material technologies and the development of philosophi
es of technology. Philosophy seems to have come late to interests in technol
ogies. Although the technological transformations of Europe, America, and la
ter parts of Asia, by industrial technologies did stimulate some philosophers
as early as the 19th century, namely Karl Marx and Ernst Kapp, it was not un
til the effects of industrialized technologies became militarized during Worl
d War I, that major philosophers became seriously engaged. In Europe, techno
logy became a theme with Ortega y Gassett, Nicolas Berdyaev, Karl Jaspers, bu
t most of all, Martin Heidegger. In America Lewis Mumford and John Dewey als
o pioneered in what was to become philosophy of technology.
While there were marked differences between these early philosophers of tech
nology—for example, most of the Europeans were interested in technology-in-g
eneral, were mostly critical or took a dystopian attitude, whereas the Americ
ans tended more towards optimism and in some degree were more empirically ori
ented—one could note that it was the praxis philosophies: Marxism, pragmatis
m, phenomenology—that developed the interest in the material.
By mid-century other social science movements, also practice centered, accel
erated the interest in technologies and materiality. New sociologies of scie
nce challenged traditional theory-biased philosophies of science, and turned
to laboratory practices and the role of instrumentation. “Social constructi
on,” the “Strong Program,” “Laboratory Life,” began to formulate a new i
mage of science which was both more socially multidimensioned and materially
produced. Later still, feminist philosophers also turned to technoscience wi
th emphases upon gender and embodiment. I shall briefly look at some of the
major features of these movements which helped shift the image of science and
technology towards technoscience.
Then, in the remainder of this lecture, I shall concentrate upon the way phe
nomenology amongst a second generation of philosophers of technology, began t
o incorporate materiality, instruments, praxis into a more postphenomenologic
al style of analysis and its “empirical turn” as recognized in recent publi
cations and conferences.
“Visualizing the Invisible: Imaging Technologies”
The third lecture will develop a case study in a postphenomenological analys
is of imaging technologies. I shall contend that science, in a rigorous and
robust sense, has always been technologically or instrumentally embodied, bu
t that as its instruments change, so does its world and our understanding of
scientific knowledge. Beginning with a historical thesis showing how pre-mod
ern science occurred in many cultures in pre-history which incorporated perc
eptual observations with simple instruments; then with new optical technologi
es in early modernity produced ‘modern’ science; and then, only since the 2
0th century moved into the high-technology imaging instruments, now produces
a postmodern science.
This newest science simultaneously takes knowledge production into the realm
of that which lies beyond human embodiment—but, in the process shows how on
e must necessarily take embodiment into account. This irony is shown explici
tly in the new processes of imaging technologies, all of which will be audio-
visually illustrated. This lecture will emphasize the focus of most current
science practice upon visualization and illustrate how the invisible is visua
lized.
“Do Things ‘Speak’?: A Material Hermeneutics”
The fourth lecture will extend the example of contemporary imaging technolo
gies to technologies which “give things voices,” in a series of variations
from analogs to many dimensions of the sensorium. The contention here is tha
t the humanities and the social sciences could benefit from the new imaging r
evolution by incorporating the recent practices of the natural sciences by ap
plying new instrumentation to humanities and social science questions. Agai
n, illustrated audio-visually, I will develop a limited number of case studie
s to show how such a material hermeneutics can and does work.
One of these examples will be “Otzi, the Iceman,” or the narrative of cons
tituted knowledge current about the 1991 freeze-dried mummy found in the Ital
ian Alps, and another will be the experimental development of instrument prod
uced data, not into the usual visualization practiced by current science, but
into acoustic presentations which have implications for both the social and
natural sciences.
“The Hermeneutic Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur”
The 20th century in Europe produced three major hermeneutic philosophers: Ma
rtin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. With the death of Paul
Ricoeur just last year, this major movement becomes philosophical history, mo
numental as it is. This lecture, while taking side glimpses at Heidegger an
d Gadamer, will focus upon the unique hermeneutical approach of Paul Ricoeur.
The features of this style of critical interpretation include a continuous
and constant relationship to phenomenology, albeit of a distinctly Ricoeurea
n type. Ricoeur argued that phenomenology must be tied to hermeneutics in o
rder not to be subjectivistic or idealistic. Secondly, Ricoeur’s hermeneuti
c approach was always dialectical in that some approach to methods other than
his own, always needed to be taken into account. Thus structuralism, psycho
analysis, analytic philosophy and a series of other approaches played a major
second voice in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Thirdly, Ricoeur’s own approach w
as always self-limiting, precisely because of its essentially dialectical str
ucture. The lecture will explore and trace out these features of a unique he
rmeneutics.