刘闯教授知识论导论课程预告 2009.02.27
来源：研究生教学
作者：
时间：2009-02-27
知识论导论课程预告
应北京大学外国哲学研究所的邀请，美国佛罗里达大学哲学系教授兼清华大学长江学者讲座教授刘闯将于2009年5月至6月初在北京大学外国哲学研究所讲授“知识论导论”的课程。欢迎有兴趣的同学参与。
授课地点：北京大学外国哲学研究所227会议室
授课时间：每周二晚7－10点，每周五晚7－9点
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE:
This course is a standard treatment of the issues and arguments in epistemology. We discuss the traditional problems and attempted solutions as well as recent alternatives. The readings are from a selection of the classics in the field, some of which are historical but most of which are contemporary. We begin with a discussion of skepticism, and then some traditional ways of dealing with that by way of sketching a philosophical theory of perception, which includes idealist as well as realist approaches. We take up next a discussion of the Gettier problem and some initial reactions to it. We then discuss the coherentist approach as a way out of both skepticism and the Gettier problem, and in the same light shall we then see the debate between internalism and externalism.
The approach of our discussion will be elementary, namely, a familiarity with the literature of epistemology is not prerequisite, and it will be in depth (rather than in breath). The readings are all in English, and so will be most of the lectures; however, the discussion can be conducted in part in Chinese.
The seminar is planned to run for 5 or so weeks with two meetings each week. Below is a tentative schedule of the topic and readings for each week.
WEEK TOPICS [readings* ]
1stw May Skepticism: Skeptical arguments and some simple rebuttals.
[Descartes, Hume, Moore, Chisholm, Lehrer]
2ndw May Perceptual knowledge: From whence and how do we acquire knowledge?
[Locke, Berkeley, Stace, Reid, Russell]
3rdw May The Gettier problem: What is wrong with the orthodox notion of knowledge?
[Gettier, Feldman, Goldman, Lehrer/Paxson, Goldman]
4thw May Coherentism: How can there be knowledge without a foundation?
[Dancy, Fumerton, Sosa, Haack, Annis]
5thw June Internalism vs. Externalism: Is knowledge evidential or causal-procedural?
[Goldman, Quine, Conee/Feldman, Steup, Kornblith, Greco]
Readings
René Descartes, Meditations 1 through 4
David Hume, Selection from “Treatise of Human Nature”
G. E. Moore, A Defense of Common Sense
Roderick M. Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion
Keith Lehrer, Why Not Skepticism?
John Locke, Selection from “Essays Concerning Human Understanding”
George Berkeley, Selection from “A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge”
W. T. Stace, Science and the Physical World
Thomas Reid, Selection from “Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man”
Bertrand Russell, Selection from “The Outline of Philosophy”
Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Richard Feldman, An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples
Alvin Goldman, A Causal Theory of Knowing
Lehrer & Paxon, Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief
Alvin Goldman, Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Jonathan Dancy, A Defense of Coherentism
Richard Fumerton, A Critique of Coherentism
Ernest Sosa, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge
Susan Haack, A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification
David Annis, A Contextual Theory of Epistemic Justification
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism: What is Justified Belief?
Keith Lehrer, A Critique of Externalism
W. V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized
Conee & Feldman, A Generality Problem for Reliabilism
Matthias Steup, A Defense of Internalism
Hilary Kornblith, Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics
John Greco, Virtues in Epistemology
(Most of these readings can be found in Louis P. Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed., Wadsworth, 2003)
应北京大学外国哲学研究所的邀请，美国佛罗里达大学哲学系教授兼清华大学长江学者讲座教授刘闯将于2009年5月至6月初在北京大学外国哲学研究所讲授“知识论导论”的课程。欢迎有兴趣的同学参与。
授课地点：北京大学外国哲学研究所227会议室
授课时间：每周二晚7－10点，每周五晚7－9点
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE:
This course is a standard treatment of the issues and arguments in epistemology. We discuss the traditional problems and attempted solutions as well as recent alternatives. The readings are from a selection of the classics in the field, some of which are historical but most of which are contemporary. We begin with a discussion of skepticism, and then some traditional ways of dealing with that by way of sketching a philosophical theory of perception, which includes idealist as well as realist approaches. We take up next a discussion of the Gettier problem and some initial reactions to it. We then discuss the coherentist approach as a way out of both skepticism and the Gettier problem, and in the same light shall we then see the debate between internalism and externalism.
The approach of our discussion will be elementary, namely, a familiarity with the literature of epistemology is not prerequisite, and it will be in depth (rather than in breath). The readings are all in English, and so will be most of the lectures; however, the discussion can be conducted in part in Chinese.
The seminar is planned to run for 5 or so weeks with two meetings each week. Below is a tentative schedule of the topic and readings for each week.
WEEK TOPICS [readings* ]
1stw May Skepticism: Skeptical arguments and some simple rebuttals.
[Descartes, Hume, Moore, Chisholm, Lehrer]
2ndw May Perceptual knowledge: From whence and how do we acquire knowledge?
[Locke, Berkeley, Stace, Reid, Russell]
3rdw May The Gettier problem: What is wrong with the orthodox notion of knowledge?
[Gettier, Feldman, Goldman, Lehrer/Paxson, Goldman]
4thw May Coherentism: How can there be knowledge without a foundation?
[Dancy, Fumerton, Sosa, Haack, Annis]
5thw June Internalism vs. Externalism: Is knowledge evidential or causal-procedural?
[Goldman, Quine, Conee/Feldman, Steup, Kornblith, Greco]
Readings
René Descartes, Meditations 1 through 4
David Hume, Selection from “Treatise of Human Nature”
G. E. Moore, A Defense of Common Sense
Roderick M. Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion
Keith Lehrer, Why Not Skepticism?
John Locke, Selection from “Essays Concerning Human Understanding”
George Berkeley, Selection from “A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge”
W. T. Stace, Science and the Physical World
Thomas Reid, Selection from “Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man”
Bertrand Russell, Selection from “The Outline of Philosophy”
Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Richard Feldman, An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples
Alvin Goldman, A Causal Theory of Knowing
Lehrer & Paxon, Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief
Alvin Goldman, Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Jonathan Dancy, A Defense of Coherentism
Richard Fumerton, A Critique of Coherentism
Ernest Sosa, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge
Susan Haack, A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification
David Annis, A Contextual Theory of Epistemic Justification
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism: What is Justified Belief?
Keith Lehrer, A Critique of Externalism
W. V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized
Conee & Feldman, A Generality Problem for Reliabilism
Matthias Steup, A Defense of Internalism
Hilary Kornblith, Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics
John Greco, Virtues in Epistemology
(Most of these readings can be found in Louis P. Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed., Wadsworth, 2003)