Lecture 1: Wittgenstein on Necessity

Speaker: Professor Mircea Dumitru

Chair: Professor CHEN Bo

Time: 07 NOV, 2019, 14:30-17:00

Place: 3109 Department of Philosophy PKU

Abstract: I argue that the Tractarian view about necessity construed as merely logical necessity (or tautology) is not satisfactory. One strand of my argument incorporates Wittgenstein’s own remarks on colours, and I show how the logical and topological considerations on the space of colours put a pressure on both the notion of an atomic state of affairs and the notion of an elementary sentence (proposition). A relational perspectives on the ontology of atomic states of affairs is examined. Another perspective on the notion of necessity is offered by the current discussion in the metaphysics of modality. From a Logic Realist point of view, I argue that what we need in metaphysics is a more robust and substantive notion of necessity.

Lecture 2: On the Normativity of Logic

Speaker: Professor Mircea Dumitru

Chair: Professor CHEN Bo

Time: 08 NOV, 2019, 14:30-17:00

Place: 3109 Department of Philosophy PKU

Abstract:

Modal and normative concepts are plenitudinous. Here there are some of the most often used concepts in philosophical explanations and/or justifications: the necessary truths of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics; the necessary connections among events/state of affairs in the natural world; the necessary or unconditional principles of ethics; and many other forms of necessary truth or connection, of oughts, of shoulds, aso.

How much real diversity are we really having here? Are all those modal/normative concepts reducible to just one kind of necessity? Or are there some forms of irreducible ways in which a truth might be necessary or a connection might hold by necessity?

The leading concept which is constitutive for the framework in which I run my analysis of the normativity of logic - or at least the way in which I make sense of all this - is an anti-reductionist stance according to which there are three main forms of necessity - the metaphysical, the natural, and the normative; and each of them is irreducible to the others or to any other form of necessity (cf. K. Fine, Modality and Tense, OUP, 2006, p. 235).

Logic itself is replete with modal/intensional/normative concepts: one regularly frames the logical/metalogical notions in terms of necessary truths, connections, etc. or in terms of what it should be the case or what it shouldn’t be the case, of what it ought to be the case, aso.

In my lecture I explore in what sense, or senses, logic can be said to be normative. In a way, this seems to be a trivial issue, for logic appears to be the paragone of a normative science! Ultimately, I argue for an exceptional status that logic enjoys amongst the other sciences.

Lecture 3: Truthmakers for Modals

Speaker: Professor Mircea Dumitru

Chair: Professor XING Taotao

Time: 15 NOV, 2019, 14:30-17:00

Place: 3109 Department of Philosophy PKU

Abstract: First, I shall give a sketch of a general theory of truthmaking, getting into the picture David Armstrong’s and Kit Fine’s views on truthmaking and grounding. Then, I shall present the current spectrum of the doctrines in the metaphysics of modality dealing with possible worlds and possible individuals. The main upshot is a defence of my own position about modals which is a modal actualist view.

Lecture 4: Meaning, Non-Existence and Non-Referring Terms. Saul Kripke on Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities

Speaker: Professor Mircea Dumitru

Chair: Professor CHEN Bo

Time: 16 NOV, 2019, 10:00-12:00

Place: 3109 Department of Philosophy PKU

Abstract: Kripke’s Naming and necessity famously and groundbrakingly argued for the rigidity of proper names. Kripke rightly points out, though, that belief ascriptions gets in the way of rigidity. Kripke’s A Puzzle about Belief amply addresses what happens when we engage in our practice of ascribing beliefs or other propositional attitudes. My talk explores issues pertaining to going beyond rigidity (as S. Soames very aptly named a book of his which tackles those issues).

Lecture 5: New Perspectives on Compositionality. Kit Fine’s Semantic Relationist Approach to Meaning

Speaker: Professor Mircea Dumitru

Chair: Professor XING Taotao

Time: 18 NOV, 2019, 14:30-17:00

Place: 3109 Department of Philosophy PKU

Abstract: The paper is an assessment of compositionality from the vantage point of Kit Fine’s semantic relationist approach to meaning. This relationist view is deepening our conception about how the meanings of propositions depend not only on the semantic features and roles of each separate meaningful unit in a complex but also on the relations that those units hold to each other. The telling feature of the formal apparatus of this Finean relationist syntax and semantics, viz. the coordination scheme, has some unexpected consequences that will emerge against the background of an analogy with the counterpart theoretic semantics for modal languages.