

# “哲学与好奇午餐会” 第三期



## 思想实验与哲学理论建构

通过案例分析的简要展示

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# 大纲

- 预先进行的必要澄清
  - 一些以思想实验为研究对象的重要的哲学问题并未纳入此次报告的讨论范围
- 关于此次报告的立场偏好的说明
  - 对于知识论领域中Methodism vs. Particularism的借鉴
- 作为理论研究工具而被普遍应用的思想实验
  - 科学研究中的思想实验
  - 哲学研究中的思想实验
- 分析哲学中的思想实验与哲学理论建构
  - 以知识论中的盖梯尔案例 (Gettier cases) 为代表

# 预先进行的必要澄清

## ► 什么是“思想实验”？

- 粗略地说，思想实验是通过想象来构造相关案例的方式来揭示某一研究对象本质的理论工具。
  - 思想实验 vs. 类比论证
  - 思想实验 vs. 纯粹的文学想象或者小说虚构

# 预先进行的必要澄清

- 围绕“思想实验”的哲学争议
  - 思想实验的本质
    - 思想实验 vs. 直觉
    - 思想实验 vs. (哲学的/先天的/经验的) 知识
  - 思想实验作为(哲学)理论研究工具的可靠性
    - 思想实验 vs. 心理学效应(例如, 启动效应、框架效应、……)
    - 思想实验 vs. 实验哲学(experimental philosophy)
- 但是
  - 上述的理论争议将**不会**作为本次报告的核心内容进行讨论和讲述。

# 关于此次报告的立场偏好的说明

- ▶ 借鉴methodism *vs.* particularism
- ▶ 知识论中的知识标准问题 (the problem of criterion)
- ▶ 以particularism立场展开此次讲座






Roderick M. Chisholm

(1916 - 1999)

# 作为理论研究的工具而被普遍应用的的思想实验

- 科学研究中的思想实验
  - 自由落体运动
    - 伽利略 vs. 亚里士多德



# 作为理论研究的工具而被普遍应用的思想实验

## 哲学研究中的思想实验

### 《孟子·公孙丑上》：

孟子曰：“……所以谓人皆有不忍人之心者，今人乍见孺子将入於井，皆有怵惕惻隐之心；……”



# 分析哲学中的思想实验与哲学理论建构

- (命题) 知识的本质/知识的分析与盖梯尔问题
- 命题知识
  - S知道 $p$  (S knows that  $p$ )
- 关于命题知识的传统分析 (JTB account)
  - 知识是得到辩护的/被证成的真信念
    - S knows that  $p$  if and only if (i) S believes that  $p$ ;  
(ii)  $p$  is true; and  
(iii) S is justified in believing that  $p$ .



# 盖梯尔问题 (the Gettier problem)

Gettier, Edmund L. (1963). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" *Analysis*, Vol. 23, No. 6 (June, 1963), pp. 121-123.

## IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF KNOWLEDGE?

By EDMUND L. GETTIER

VARIOUS attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:<sup>1</sup>

- (a) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true,  
(ii) S believes that P, and  
(iii) S is justified in believing that P.

For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge:<sup>2</sup>

- (b) S knows that P IFF (i) S accepts P,  
(ii) S has adequate evidence for P,  
and  
(iii) P is true.

Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows:<sup>3</sup>

- (c) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true,  
(ii) S is sure that P is true, and  
(iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a *sufficient* condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if 'has adequate evidence for' or 'has the right to be sure that' is substituted for 'is justified in believing that' throughout.

I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of 'justified' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. Keeping these two points in mind, I shall now present two cases

<sup>1</sup>Plato seems to be considering some such definition at *Theaetetus* 201, and perhaps accepting one at *Meno* 98.

<sup>2</sup>Roderick M. Chisholm, *Perceiving: a Philosophical Study*, Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New York, 1957), p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Macmillan (London, 1956), p. 34.

in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.

*Case I:*

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

- (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:

- (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.

But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not *know* that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.

*Case II:*

Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:

- (f) Jones owns a Ford.

Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-names quite at random, and constructs the following three propositions:

- (g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;


- (h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona;  
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.

But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does *not* own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does *not* know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.


These two examples show that definition (a) does not state a *sufficient* condition for someone's knowing a given proposition. The same cases, with appropriate changes, will suffice to show that neither definition (b) nor definition (c) do so either.

Wayne State University



# 停走的钟表 (the case of stopped clock)

- 一位名叫约翰的男子在一天清早下楼，他看到他家里的闹钟显示的时间是“09:06”。基于此，约翰相信现在的时刻是上午09:06，他的这一信念是真的，因为现在的真实时刻就是上午09:06。而且，约翰的这一信念由于是以很好的证据理由为基础的，因此也是得到辩护的。例如，约翰通常就是大约在上午的这个时刻下楼，因此他知道这个时刻是基本准确的。而且这台闹钟在多年之间一直是可靠地报时的，约翰也没有理由认为它现在报时是错误的。因此，他有很好的理由相信座钟所呈报的时间是正确的。但是，我们可以进一步假定，不被约翰所知的是，这台座钟在24小时之前恰好停止了，因此，约翰现在是通过看一台停走的钟表来形成了一条得到辩护的真信念。  
(改写自 Pritchard 2014, 24-25.)



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
# 伪谷仓案例 (fake barn case)



Alvin Goldman



Karl Ginet



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# 盖梯尔案例与盖梯尔问题

## 盖梯尔案例的实质

- 传统的JTB知识定义不是命题知识的充分条件

- 盖梯尔案例例示了

- 相关认知主体拥有关于目标命题 (target proposition) 的得到辩护的真信念，但是，(直觉上)

- 该主体并不知道相关的目标命题。

- 盖梯尔案例为我们揭示出


- 得到辩护的真信念 $p$  vs. 命题知识 $p$

# 关于命题知识的理论建构

- 命题知识比得到辩护的真信念在认知上更为强健 (epistemically robust)
- 盖梯尔案例
  - 碰巧为真的信念 (accidentally true belief)
- 命题知识不是碰巧为真的信念
  - 知识不容易出错
    - 假定：我们不要求知识是不可错的 (infallible)

# 关于命题知识的理论建构

- 敏感的 (sensitive) 信念
  - S knows that  $p$  蕴含
    - $\neg p \square \rightarrow \neg [B_S(p) \text{ via } M]$ 
      - Cf. Nozick's tracking theory
  - 敏感性条件对盖梯尔问题的解决
    - 停走的钟表
    - 伪谷仓



Robert Nozick  
(1938 - 2002)

# 敏感信念与钟表店案例

➔ 敏感的 (sensitive) 信念

➔ S knows that  $p$  蕴含  $\neg p \square \rightarrow \neg[B_S(p) \text{ via } M]$



# 理论洞见与理论建构

- 钟表店案例提示我们
  - 刻画命题知识的认知上的强健性的恰当方案究竟是什么？
    - 在理论抽象、形式化表达与严格刻画的同时，需要保持和参照原初的（素朴的）理论洞见
- 安全的 (safe) 信念
  - $S$  knows that  $p$  蕴含
    - $[B_S(p) \text{ via } M] \Box \rightarrow p$ 
      - Cf. Duncan Pritchard, Ernest Sosa, Keith DeRose



# 安全信念与认知荣誉


- 安全的 (safe) 信念
  - $[B_S(p) \text{ via } M] \Box \rightarrow p$
- 认知荣誉 (epistemic credit)
  - 德性知识论 (virtue epistemology)

# 被移植的带磁极的细菌


## Magnetic Navigation in Bacteria

*Certain aquatic bacteria are magnetotactic: they have tiny internal compasses that orient them in the earth's magnetic field. Swimming along the inclined magnetic field lines directs them toward the mud*

by Richard P. Blakemore and Richard B. Frankel




Fred I. Dretske  
(1932 - 2013)



**SURVIVAL VALUE OF MAGNETOTAXIS** to a bottom-dwelling bacterium is shown for three latitudes. In the Northern Hemisphere (left) a south-seeking bacterium is directed downward toward the

Hemisphere (right) south-seeking bacteria tend to swim downward and north-seeking ones upward. Near the geomagnetic equator (middle) both types of bacteria are found and both are directed horizontal



**MAGNETOTACTIC BACTERIUM** is seen in a transmission electron micrograph, which reveals a striking feature of its internal structure: a chain of magnetosomes that are oriented in the direction of the earth's magnetic field. The species shown here has a flagellum at one end and a chain of magnetosomes at the other. It is capable of swimming ac-

谢谢大家！

敬请批评指正！

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